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Abstract- Mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) are collections of wireless mobile devices with restricted 
broadcast range and resources and no fixed infrastructure. Communication is achieved by 
communicating data along suitable routes that are dynamically discovered and maintained through 
association between the nodes. Discovery of such routes is a major task both from good organization 
and security points of view. Recently a security model tailored to the specific requirements of MANETs. 
A novel route discovery algorithm called endairA is also proposed together with a claimed security 
proof within the same model. In this paper we show the security proof for the route discovery algorithm 
endairA is malfunctioning and moreover this algorithm is vulnerable to a hidden channel attack. We 
also analyze the security framework that is used for route discovery and argue the compos ability is an 
essential feature for ubiquitous applications. We conclude by discussing some of the major security 
challenges for route discovery in MANETs. 
 
 
Index terms: Fast Mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs), Message Authentication Codes(MACs),Source 
Routing Protocol(SRP) 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Our main involvement in this work is to show the security proof for endairA given in blemished 
and that this routing algorithm is similarly subject to a hidden channel attack. Revisiting the ABV 
model we present several reasons we think the concurrent security for MANET route discovery 
i.e. the ABV model's security standardize insouciant in practice because it requires the absence of 
channels that are always present in any real-world MANET application. We can argue the higher 
security standard namely compos ability is a fundamental requirement for omnipresent 
applications. We make some observations about issues that have to be addressed by any routing 
protocol achieves security in a compos able model. We review route discovery and the Ariadne 
protocol we show the security authentication for endairA is terrified[1]. This algorithm is subject 
to a concealed channel attack. We discuss the significance of concurrency-based attacks and the 
requirements for a formal security framework for MANETs. We discuss challenges for secure 
route discovery and we summarize our arguments for provable security in MANETs. Mobile ad 
hoc networks are collection of wireless mobile devices with restricted broadcast range and 
resources, no fixed infrastructure .Interrelated collection of wireless nodes enter and leave over 
time. In also act as routers and forward packets which has no pre-established network 
infrastructure and there is no centralized management and no preexisting infrastructure. In 
MANETs all hosts are mobile and Lack well pre-defined relationship. In this the Power 
constraint and limited computational capability are used in the ad hoc networks. Where the Hosts 
communicate through the wireless links which means the radio channels and the Hosts oblige to 
route packets within the network itself. Routing is important that the route discovery can be 
changed in any order which is no fixed infra structures [7, 8, and 9]. 
Several attempts have been made to address the security of MANET route discovery more 
robustly, the most recent one being introduced in a series of papers by [2], and [3, 4,].In these 
works, the authors develop a formal idealization and simulation framework that adapts ideas from 
the secure reactive systems approach and the universally compassable security approach to the 
realm of MANET applications[5,6]. 
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II. PERSONALITY OF MANETS 
 
 
  
Fig:1 Personality of MANETs 
In personality of manets the dynamic Topologies and node memberships plays vita role. Where 
the Bandwidth is limitations and there will be Many broadcast Errors due to there no fixed infra 
structure .The Energy-constrained function is more shown in fig 1. 
 
III. MANETS AND THE INTERNET 
In both the mobile ad hoc networks and in internet the Future goal is faultless net connectivity 
because due to the infra structure. Where the mobile IP requests to be modified according to the 
users and the common interfacing between Bluetooth, WAP and IP are connected to the user 
applications need for handheld and moveable computing devices. where ad hoc networks and 
internet both provides security to their users during the connection. The nodes of a MANETs 
routers that build up routes dynamically and insert into the wireless topologies. 
 
IV. PROPOSED WORK 
Bridges operate in both the physical and the data link layer of the OSI model .Bridges can divide 
a large network into smaller segments. Bridges can also provide through this partitioning of 
traffic. A bridge operates at the data link layer, giving it access to the physical addresses of all 
stations connected to it. When a frame enters a bridge, the bridge not only regenerates the signal 
but checks the address of the destination and forwards the new copy only to the segment to which 
the address belongs.(Fig:2) 
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Fig.2 Architecture  Diagram 
As a bridge encounters a pocket, it reads the address contained in the frame and compares that 
address with a table of all the stations on both segments. When it finds a match, it discovers to 
which segment the station belongs and relays the packet only to that segment. In a ring topology, 
each devices has a dedicated point to point line configuration only with the two devices on either 
side of it. A signal is passed along the ring in one direction, from device to device, until it reaches 
its destination. Each device in the ring incorporates the bits and passes them along. A packet from 
host A addressed to host B arrives at the bridge. host A is one of the same segment as host B, 
therefore the packet is blocked from crossing into the lower segment instead the packet is relayed 
to the entire upper segment and received by the host B. 
 
V. ROUTING ALGORITHMS 
Route discovery is initiated by a source node S that requests from its neighbors information can 
be used to find a route that links it to a target node T. The neighbors of S forward the request to 
their neighbors who in turn forward it to their neighbors and so on until eventually a route that 
links S to T is discovered. All nodes on a route other than S; T are called intermediate nodes. 
There are two general types of route discovery: proactive and reactive or on-demand. Proactive 
routing is usually table driven: nodes maintain routing tables with routing information to 
potential target nodes. The tables are updated at regular intervals, and are used by intermediate 
nodes for route discovery. With reactive algorithms, routes are discovered only when needed. 
Proactive routing is network-centric, and is appropriate for networks with heavy communication 
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trace for which security is not critical. Reactive routing is source-centric: intermediate nodes are 
restricted to forwarding and possibly verifying route requests or route responses From a security 
point of view, reactive (on-demand) routing is preferable because the security is to a large extent 
centralized (managed by the source).Proactive routing is network-centric and appropriate for 
networks with heavy communication traffic for which security is not critical. Indeed, such routing 
strategies tend to rely on link-to-link security which implies trust in intermediate nodes. Reactive 
routing is source-centric: intermediate nodes are restricted to forwarding and possibly verifying 
route requests or route responses. From a security point of view, reactive (on-demand) routing is 
easier to analyze for its security properties because the security is end-to-end (managed by the 
source and target). 
VI. SOURCE ROUTING PROTOCOL (SRP) 
SRP is an on-demand source routing protocol that captures the basic features of reactive routing. 
In SRP route requests generated by a source S is protected by MACs (Message Authentication 
Codes) computed using a key shared with the target T. Requests are broadcast to all the 
neighbors of S. Each neighbor that receives a request for the first time appends its identifier to the 
request and re-broadcasts it. 
 
Intermediate nodes do the same. The MAC in the request is not checked because only S and T 
know the key used to compute it. When this request reaches the target T, its MAC is checked by 
T. If it is valid then it is assumed by the target that all adjacent pairs of nodes on the path of the 
route request are neighbors. Such paths are called valid or plausible routes. The target T replaces 
the MAC of a valid route request, by a MAC computed with the same key that authenticates the 
route. This is then sending back (upstream) to S using the reverse route. 
A route request that reaches an intermediate node Xj is of the form: 
 
VII. Msgs, T, rreq = (rreq, S, T, id, Sn, X1… Xj; macs); 
With id a randomly generated route identifier, sn a session number and macS a MAC on (rreq; S; 
T; id; sn) computed by S using a key shared with T. If S,X1……Xp, T is a discovered route, then 
the route reply of the target T has the following  fixed form for all intermediate nodes Xj , 1 ≤ j  ≤ 
p. fixed form for all intermediate nodes Xj , 1 ≤ j ≤ p. 
 
M.Anto Bennet,  G.Vijayalakshmi, P.Shenbagavalli, M.Vijayalakshmi and S.Saranya  
Secure route discovery for dynamic source routing in manets 
431 
VIII. MsgS, T, rrep = (rrep, s, t, id, sn, x1...xp,mact); 
Where macT is a MAC computed by T with the key shared with S on the message field preceding 
it. Intermediate nodes should check the route reply header (including its id and sn) and those they 
are adjacent with two of their neighbors on the route before sending the route reply upstream.
 Observe that even though the upstream route from T to S is authenticated by the target, 
the downstream route (S to T) is not. Consequently faulty node pairs (Xj, Xj+1) that are adjacent 
on the route may not be neighbors, but may divert extra c via other routes. The faulty nodes need 
not include the details of these routes in the route request. It is similarly possible for a malicious 
node to pad route requests with the identities of other nodes that are not its neighbors and 
impersonate these nodes in the reply phase. The resulting route therefore may not be valid in the 
sense that some of its adjacent nodes may not be neighbors. 
 
IX. ARIADNE 
ARIADNE is an on-demand routing algorithm based on the Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) 
protocol. There are several variants of Adriane depending on which mode of authentication is 
used to protect route requests: one uses digital signatures and one uses MACs. The MAC 
versions have an optimized variant uses iterated MAC computations instead of several 
independent MACs. 
 
X. Basic Ariadne Route Discovery 
We present the design of the Ariadne protocol in three stages: we first present a mechanism that 
enables the target to verify the authenticity of the route request; we then present three alternative 
mechanisms for authenticating data in route requests and route replies; and finally, we present an 
efficient per-hop hashing Technique to verify that no node is missing from the node list in the 
request. In the following discussion we assume that the initiator] performs S.A Route Discovery 
for target D, and that they share the secret keys KSD and KDS respectively, for message 
authentication in each direction.  A typical route request that reaches an intermediate node 
Ax, 1≤ j ≤ p, on the route S = X0, X1………, Xp, Xp+1 = T is Of the form 
 
msgS,T, freq. = (freq., S, T, id,X1, . . .,Ax, macSX1….Ax), 
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Where macSX1….Ax is the MAC computed by Axwith a key it 
shares with T on the route request received from Ax. 
 
XI. Target authenticates route requests 
 To convince the target of the legitimacy of each field in a route request the initiator 
simply includes a MAC computed with key KD over unique data for example a timestamp. The 
target can easily verify the authenticity and freshness of the route request using the shared key 
KS. 
 
XII. Three techniques for data authentication 
In a route discovery, the initiator wants to authenticate each individual node in the node list of the 
route reply. A secondary requirement is that the target can authenticate each node in the node list 
of the route request so that it will return a route reply only along paths that contain only 
legitimate nodes. We present three alternative techniques to achieve node list authentication: the 
TESLA protocol digital signatures and standard MACs. In our design, we assume that a sender 
trusts the destination with which it communicates, for authenticating nodes on the path between 
them. This assumption is straightforward, as the destination node can control all communication 
with the sender anyway. The destination node can potentially blackmail nodes on the path to the 
sender. The sender thus needs to keep a separate blacklist for each destination. 
 
XIII. ANALYSIS OF ARIADNE 
 This framework is used to analyze SRP and Ariadne finding them insecure against 
hidden-channel attacks, and led to the design of endairA an on-demand route discovery protocol 
that the authors claim to be provably secure. The security framework which we refer as the ABV 
model. A proof of the security claim for endairA is also given in the analysis. 
 
XIV. THE ABV MODEL 
In the generic secure reactive system approach but there are some crucial differences. In the ABV 
framework: The adversary does not have full control of message delivery schedule, in the sense 
that the broadcast channel enforces the concept of communication rounds in particular, the ABV 
framework does not capture rushing attacks (synchrony) The adversary may prompt honest 
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parties to initiate new route discoveries but not dishonest ones in other words the ABV security 
framework does not capture concurrent security in the presence of route discovery sessions that 
are initiated by adversarial nodes. The adversary is non-adaptive, i.e., cannot initiate new route 
discoveries as a function of previously observed messages of for these restrictions. The link 
configuration GV, EÞ, V, LÞ of an MANET is enforced in the security framework by the 
communication medium functionality (Machine C in the real-world model of ABV). These 
approaches compare executions of a protocol in a real-world model to its executions in an ideal-
world model that is controlled by the functionality F, which captures formally the goals that is 
supposed to achieve. In the real world, the adversary is modeled as a traditional Byzantine 
adversary of the Dolev-Yao model, i.e., it is able to Schedule and tamper with all communication 
channels to provide inputs to honest parties and observe their outputs, 1 and coordinate the 
actions of all corrupted parties. Additionally, the adversary is capable of interacting with other 
sessions of the protocol that may be executing concurrently.2 the ideal-world adversary mimics 
the behavior of the real-world one to allow for simulations of real-world protocol executions in 
the ideal world. In order that be secure in this framework, the effects on the execution of  in the 
real-world model by any real-world adversary A should be indistinguishable from those of an 
appropriately chosen ideal-world adversary A0 in the ideal world model. 
XV. Ariadne: Prevent Route Request Flood 
DoS Attack: Impersonate other nodes and issue Route Requests  Solution: Use one-way hash 
chain and disclose new element in each Route Request, similar to S/Key Attacker can at worst 
produce as many Route Requests as sender. 
 
XVI. Ariadne: Prevent Hop Drop 
 Source and destination share KSD. Source adds h0 = MAC( KSD, request ). Every hop 
computes hi = H( Node id | hi-1 ) (H is one-way cryptographic hash function)  Destination 
computes h0 reconstructs each hi  Attacker cannot drop nodes from address list in Route Request. 
 
XVII. Ariadne: Route Authentication 
Use TESLA to authenticate each hop. Every hop adds a MAC to Route Request. Destination 
verifies security condition. Every hop discloses key in Route Reply. Source can authenticate all 
hops. 
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XVIII. EndairA – a secure source routing protocol 
Target verifies: 
There’s no repeating ID in the node list last node in the node list is a neighbor each intermediate 
node verifies its own ID is in the node list and there’s no repeating ID in the node list. Then the 
next and previous nodes in the node list are neighbors each other .Where all signatures are valid 
and correspond to the nodes in the node list itself. 
Source verifies: 
 There’s no repeating ID in the node list first node in the node list is a neighbor each node verifies 
its own node list all signatures are valid and correspond to the nodes in the node list shown in fig 
3.   
 
Fig.3 Node list 
S → * : [ rreq, S, D, id, () ] 
B → * : [ rreq, S, D, id, (B) ] 
C → * : [ rreq, S, D, id, (B, C) ] 
D → C : [ rrep, S, D, (B, C), (sigD) ] 
C → B : [ rrep, S, D, (B, C), (sigD, sigC) ] 
B → S : [ rrep, S, D, (B, C), (sigD, sigC, sigB) ] 
 
XIX. PROVABLE SECURITY FOR AD HOC NETWORK ROUTING PROTOCOLS 
Several “secure” routing protocols have been proposed for wireless ad hoc networks .SRP, 
Ariadne, S-AODV, ARAN, SEAD.Their security have been analyzed mainly by informal means. 
Informal reasoning about security protocols is prone to errors and lessons learnt in the field of 
key exchange protocols. Where some attacks have been found against SRP,  Ariadne, and S-
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AODV. Then we need more assurances about mathematical models, precise definitions and 
sound proof techniques shown in fig 4. 
 
XX. AN ATTACK ON ARIADNE 
 
 
       Fig.4 ATTACK ON ARIADNE 
 
X → * : [ RREQ, S, D, id, hX, (…, X), (…, macXD) ] 
A → * : [ RREQ, S, D, id, *, (…, X, A), (…, macXD, hX) ] 
W → * : [ RREQ, S, D, id, *, (…, X, A, V, …, W), (…, macXD, hX, …, macWD)] 
 A :hA = H( A | hX ) 
A → * : [ RREQ, S, D, id, hA, (…, X, A), (…, macXD, macAD) ] … … 
Z → A : [ RREP, D, S, (…, X, A, Z, …), macDS ] 
A → W : [ RREP, D, S, (…, X, Y, V, … W, A, …), macDS ] … … 
V → Y : [ RREP, D, S, (…, X, Y, V, … W, A, …), macDS ] 
A → X : [ RREP, D, S, (…, X, A, Z, …), macDS ] … … 
? → S : [ RREP, D, S, (…, X, A, Z, …), macDS ] (a non-existent route!) 
 
XXI. CONFIGURATION 
 An ad hoc network is represented by a graph G (V, E).where the V: vertices are network nodes 
(honest and adversarial )E: edges represent communication links (radio or wormhole) V* ⊂ V is 
a set of distinguished nodes (under the adversary’s control) . L is a labeling function (assigns IDs 
to nodes) with the following restrictions: Each honest node has a unique, uncompromised ID. 
Each adversarial node is labeled with all the compromised IDs shown in fig 5. They assume that 
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ID’s are authenticated during neighbor discovery (Sybil attack is excluded) a configuration is a 
triplet: (G, V*, L). 
 
  
Fig.5 Configuration triplet 
 
XXII. Hidden Channel and Concurrency Attacks 
There are other channels that in many respects are much more natural. Indeed, the main objective 
of a route discovery algorithm is to find a route that is a suitable communication channel. Route 
discovery per se makes little sense. It would, therefore, be natural for nodes to use for their 
communication a route that was discovered earlier, whatever their intention. Therefore, it is 
unreasonable to restrict nodes from using hidden channels. Note that privacy is a legitimate goal 
for secure communication, so intermediate nodes should expect to retransmit the encrypted data. 
Let us now pursue our earlier discussion on interleaving protocol instances. In a networking 
environment, one should expect that several instantiations of a routing protocol are executed. 
Some may involve route discovery, while others route maintenance, data communication, or 
general network applications. It makes no sense to require that route communication can only 
start when all the other route discovery instantiations (and network applications) have been 
completed. Indeed, this argument should be carried to its logical extension: the security of any 
protocol should not be considered in isolation, but in the presence of Concurrent executions, i.e., 
whether these involve the same protocol or other protocols. Consequently, in our adversarial 
model, we should allow the adversary to interleave instantiations of several protocols, all running 
concurrently. This is a natural requirement for security. 
 
XXIII. The Adversary 
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It is sometimes suggested that adversarial nodes should be bound by the same constraints as non 
adversarial nodes, for example, have similar communication capabilities . This may be the case 
for some applications, but it is not realistic. Although, it may seem reasonable to assume that the 
resources of adversarial nodes are (polynomials) bounded, allowing for the constraints on 
ubiquitous applications, it is unreasonable to assume that adversarial nodes cannot use more 
powerful transmitters than non adversarial nodes. say transmitters that are 50 percent more 
powerful than the norm 5 if with such means they can compromise the system. 
XXIV. Compensability Issues: 
We argue that compos ability is an essential requirement for secure routing in MANETs. Indeed, 
MANETs can distinctly be characterized from fixed-infrastructure networks by the fact that both 
the control plane (routing messages) and the data plane (proper communication messages) are 
highly subject to a variety of attacks. It becomes essential to understand how the security 
requirements of each layer interfere with each other. The packet is therefore discarded at the SSL 
layer. However, since it was already accepted at the TCP layer, and moreover, has arrived earlier 
than the legitimate packet from the original sender, it will prevent TCP from accepting the latter 
(legitimate) packet. This is because the TCP daemon has recorded that packet’s sequence number 
as already received. The SSL session layer fails to recover the missing data, and therefore, 
SSL+TCP do not provide availability guarantees. In this scheme, TCP provides availability but 
not integrity. SSL provides integrity but relies on the availability properties of TCP. This reliance 
proves unfounded, as the availability guarantees of TCP are only provided under the weaker 
integrity notion corresponding to verifiability of the TCP checksums. Composability fails 
accordingly. MANET routing security presents very similar problems. Indeed, as has been 
demonstrated by the designers of the endairA protocol, even the provision of a single property 
(safety of routing discovery) requires at least a concurrent approach, as illustrated by the attacks 
on Ariadne . We extend this observation by remarking that special care needs to be taken when 
assuming properties of lower network layers, especially when such properties are achieved under 
restrictions. 
 
XXV. SECURE ROUTE DISCOVERY CHALLENGES 
Our argument about the impossibility of secure discovery of routes is simple and has been 
articulated throughout the project. We base it on the fact that every route discovery algorithm is, 
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in practice, vulnerable to attacks that exploit alternative communication channels to articulate 
distributed attacks by encapsulating and tunneling routing requests. Therefore, it does not seem 
possible to capture or model out Sybil and wormhole attacks from pure-protocol-based security 
models. The purpose of routing being to establish a communication infrastructure, it is always 
reasonable to assume the existence of alternative communication channels, namely those that 
route discovery will establish.Even though it is not possible to discover secure routes in general 
MANETs, there are several other approaches that could be used to establish secure 
communication channels.In the following, we consider two such approaches: multipath routes 
and route discovery with traceability. 
 
XXVI. Multipath and Sub graphs 
Routes need not be restricted to paths in the network graph G:  Any sub graph GST of that links 
the source S to the target T can be used for communication. Particular interest, from a security 
point of view, are sub graphs GST with multiple connectivity between S; T, for example, multi 
paths. Such routes may have sufficient redundancy to guarantee communication, i.e., may contain 
at least one secure path (with no adversarial nodes). However, there are ways to partly mitigate 
this. For example, the source can select communication paths in GST on a rotation basis 
(adaptive multipath routing). Another approach is to use random sub graphs GST of G that link 
S; T. Gossip protocols use this approach, which guarantees packet propagation while minimizing 
the number of nodes that forward packets. The latter approach completely blurs all separation of 
the routing discovery, maintenance, and data communication phases. Paradoxically, this 
approach’s meshing of functionalities may facilitate showing the compensability of its security 
properties. 
 
XXVII. Route Discovery with Traceability 
In general solutions such as those proposed above are only appropriate for applications in which 
security is critical. Perhaps, a more practical solution would be to use routing Algorithms that 
trace malicious behavior. It is possible to do this in such a way that there is practically no 
additional cost when the adversary is passive, while the extra cost is only for tracing adversarial 
nodes (optimistic tracing). This approach supports self-healing security: The power of the 
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adversary is diminished with each attack if we assume that the number of adversarial nodes is 
bounded over time. 
 
XXVIII. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS: 
ADAIRNE 
 
Fig.6 Loss graph 
 
  
  Fig.7  Throughput graph 
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           Fig.8 Delay graph                              
 
 
          Fig.9 Adairne output 
 
 
           Fig.10 Loss graph                                        
 
 
Fig.11 Throughput graph 
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Fig.12 Delay graph                               
 
 
                  Fig.13 EndairA output 
XXIX. ENDAIRA 
The delay also shows the comparison between ARIADNE and ENDAIRA as shown in figure 13 
ARIADNE (shown in fig 9) Contributes higher delay than ENDAIRA. Communications, 
assigning MAC authentications between nodes takes more time to verify even though each node 
can’t detect the present of adversary. Once the messages arrives to the destination, and get reply 
back with the routes which is does not exist, it will cause a problem especially when to  verify the 
correct route after adversary has been detected. No one will confess which one is the correct route 
along the transmission. The system throughput or aggregate throughput is the sum of the data 
rates that are delivered to all terminals in a network shown in fig 7. The throughput of a 
communication system may be affected by various factors, including the limitations of 
underlying analog physical medium, available processing power of the system components, and 
end-user behavior. When various protocol overheads are taken into account, useful rate of the 
transferred data can be significantly lower than the maximum achievable throughput; the useful 
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part is usually referred to as good put shown in fig 11..Packet loss can reduce throughput for a 
given sender, whether unintentionally due to network malfunction, or intentionally as a means to 
balance available bandwidth between multiple senders when a given router or network link 
reaches nears its maximum capacity. When reliable delivery is necessary, packet loss increases 
latency due to additional time needed for retransmission. Assuming no retransmission, packets 
experiencing the worst delays might be preferentially dropped resulting in lower latency overall 
at the price of data loss shown in fig 6. During typical network congestion, not all packets in a 
stream are dropped. This means that un dropped packets will arrive with low latency compared to 
retransmitted packets, which arrive with high latency. Not only do the retransmitted packets have 
to travel part of the way twice, but the sender will not realize the packet has been dropped until it 
either fails to receive acknowledgement of receipt in the expected order, or fails to receive 
acknowledgement for a long enough time that it assumes the packet has been dropped as opposed 
to merely delayed shown in fig 10.And their corresponding delay shown in fig8&12. 
 
XXX. CONCLUSION 
A new security framework tailored for on-demand route discovery protocols in MANETs was 
proposed in this represents a first effort toward a formal security model that can deal with 
concurrent attacks and is successful in mitigating a class of hidden channel attacks the attacks 
that are intrinsic to the wireless broadcast medium in a neighborhood. However, as we observed 
above, there are a plethora of other hidden channels that become available through concurrent 
execution of route discovery protocols. Additionally, in the context of mobility, which requires 
that route discovery take place simultaneously with data communication, large additional 
bandwidth is naturally generated and available to adversarial nodes. Consequently, in the 
proposed formal model, it is impossible to prevent that adversarial nodes break up routes by 
inserting non existing links. To address this shortcoming, either more flexible definitions of 
routes must be employed (e.g., redundant routing) or it becomes necessary to address global 
threats directly, such as those posed by Sybil, wormhole, and more generally, man-in-the-middle 
attacks. 
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